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INTRODUCTION 
CEO stock option compensation increased tremendously from 1992-2000. In 1992, 
slightly more than two thirds of CEOs in the S&P 1,500 companies received some 
form of stock option compensation, accounting—on average—for less than a quarter of 
their total compensation. By 2000, over 95 percent of these CEOs were paid in stock 
options, accounting for close to half of their total compensation (see Table 1).1 Table 
1 shows that between 1992 and 2000, CEO stock options granted increased by 472 
percent and that the mean value of stock options by 2000 was over $4 million. 
  TABLE 1
  Summary of the Mean and Standard Deviations of Stock Option Values, 
  Salary, and Stock Option Share of Total Compensation from 1992 to 2000
Year  Stock Options (in $1,000)  Salary (in $1,000)  Stock Options as Share  
      of Total Compensation
 Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
   Deviation    Deviation    Deviation
1992 707.30  1,473.59  654.22 297.28  0.244  0.236
1993 743.86  2,149.20  564.94 283.28  0.258  0.248
1994 908.63  2,214.84  536.47 288.38  0.288  0.268
1995 914.78  2,754.29  552.80 303.34  0.277  0.261
1996 1,412.82 3,754.28  575.99  308.71  0.337  0.280
1997 2,066.57 6,446.91  583.92  306.89  0.373  0.300
1998 2,210.59 6,291.34  599.54  319.00  0.406  0.300
1999 3,273.45 9,955.27  612.05  333.49  0.445  0.310
2000 4,048.44  15,379.17  654.21  356.19  0.442  0.316
If stocks obtained by exercising incentive stock options (ISOs) are held for more 
than one year, the income from the sale of such stock is taxed at the capital gains 
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gains tax rate is much lower than the maximum marginal income tax rate during 
most of the 1992-2000 period covered in our data (see Table 2). This differential tax 
treatment creates a tax reduction opportunity for CEOs in the United States.
 TABLE  2
  Summary of the (Top) Marginal Income Tax Rates, Long-Term Capital 
  Gains Tax Rates, and the Spread from 1992 to 2000
Year  Income Tax Rate  Cap. Gains Tax Rate  Spread b/t Income and Capital Gains
  (in percent)  (in percent)  (in percentage points)
1992 31.0  28  3.0
1993 39.6  28  11.6
1994 39.6  28  11.6
1995 39.6  28  11.6
1996 39.6  28  11.6
1997 39.6  20  19.6
1998 39.6  20  19.6
1999 39.6  20  19.6
2000 39.6  20  19.6
 
In addressing the recent scandals of Enron and WorldCom, Senator Carl Levin 
suggested that stock option pay encourages CEOs to push the tax beneﬁ  ts and ac-
counting rules to the limit, which might have severe consequences for government tax 
revenues and the stability of our economy. If stock option pay lowers tax revenues and 
creates more uncertainty and risk, the U.S. may want to reduce the tax advantages 
of stock option compensation. 
In addressing stock option compensation, many researchers have examined the 
principal-agent problem. Sanders [2001], Mehran [1995], Dhillon and Ramirez [1994], 
Rosen [1990], and Jensen and Meckling [1976] address whether the growing number of 
stock options impacts a ﬁ  rm’s risk and performance. These studies analyze the impact 
of stock options and whether they improve employee relations, attract better work-
ers, increase cash ﬂ  ows, reduce agency costs, promote shareholder wealth, and create 
takeover defense strategies to improve overall ﬁ  rm performance. Hall and Liebman 
[1998] examine the impacts of stock option compensation on ﬁ  rm performance. While 
these are all signiﬁ  cant factors contributing to the growing importance of stock options 
as a form of payment, they fail to address whether federal tax policy inﬂ  uences CEO 
compensation and its consequences for the United States tax revenues. 
Woodbury [1983], Rose and Wolfram [2002], Hall and Liebman [2000], Goolsbee 
[2000], and Auerbach and Siegel [2000] examine how tax policy alters compensation. 
Woodbury suggests that as income tax rates increase, so do fringe beneﬁ  ts or nonwage 
compensation in place of wage compensation. However, Rose and Wolfram ﬁ  nd little 
support for the hypothesis that tax policy increases the use of nonwage stock option 
compensation. They examine if the tax law changes in the early 1990s (including the 
Omnibus act of 1993) impacts the use of nonwage performance based pay for execu-
tives and ﬁ  nd very little evidence supporting an increase in any type of performance 
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Auerbach and Siegel [2000] examine the short-term and long-term impacts of 
capital gains tax rates on total capital gains compensation for the rich. Using IRS 
data from 1985-1994, they ﬁ  nd that capital gains income has a short-term timing 
response to a change in the capital gains tax rates. Similarly, using Standard and 
Poor’s ExecuComp database from 1991 to 1995, Goolsbee [2000] studies the respon-
siveness of taxable income to a change in the marginal income tax rate, given total 
compensation. More speciﬁ  cally, he distinguishes between the transitory (short-term) 
and the permanent (long-term) impacts of a change in the marginal income tax rate, 
when examining the shifts in compensation. Focusing on the years right before and 
after the 1993 increase in marginal income tax rates, he ﬁ  nds that the short-term 
elasticity of taxable income to the marginal income tax rate is greater than one due 
to the exercise of stock options. However, he also ﬁ  nds that the long-term elasticity 
is less than 0.4, suggesting that increases in stock option compensation are only an 
intertemporal shift in compensation and have very little long-term effect. 
Using a data set from 1980-1994 of corporate proxies and 10k ﬁ  lings from CRSP, 
Hall and Liebman [2000] ﬁ  nd no evidence of Goolsbee’s intertemporal tax shifting 
once they incorporate the impacts of the stock market and the market value of the 
ﬁ  rm. Using the share of stock option compensation to total income, Hall and Liebman 
ﬁ  nd that an increase in the income tax rate has a small positive impact on the share 
of stock options while the capital gains and the corporate tax rates have a relatively 
large negative impact. They also ﬁ  nd that a 10 percent increase in the market value 
of a ﬁ  rm leads to an increase in CEO stock and stock option value by $1.25 million. As 
a result, they conclude that the increase in stock options compensation was caused by 
the increases in the market value of the ﬁ  rm, instead of the changes in tax policy. 
While Hall and Liebman, Auerbach and Siegel, and Goolsbee use an earlier time 
period to investigate the timing of compensation due to a change in tax policy, our goal 
is to examine whether CEOs’ share of stock option compensation responds to a change 
in both the marginal income and capital gains tax rates throughout the 1990s. We use 
the ExecuComp data set from 1992-2000, which is a more comprehensive series that 
incorporates the tremendous increase in stock option compensation and a change in 
both the marginal income and capital gains tax rates.
To study the impacts of legislature governing the capital gains and income tax 
rates on a CEO’s choice between wages and stock options, we estimate a logit model to 
examine whether and how preferential tax treatment affects the probability of CEOs 
receiving any form of stock option compensation. Then we determine the degree of this 
impact and examine how responsive stock option compensation is to changes in either 
of the two relevant tax rates using a Tobit model, using both the share of stock option 
compensation and the total value of stock options. In general, our ﬁ  ndings show that 
both an increase in the marginal income tax rate and a decrease in the capital gains 
tax rate increase the probability of CEOs being paid with stock options and cause a 
rather large increase in the share and value of CEO stock option compensation.
The remainder of this paper provides a brief overview of federal tax policy as it 
relates to stock options and marginal income and capital gains tax rates in section 2. 346 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Section 3 develops the theoretical model. The next section describes the estimation and 
data used in the study. Section 5 presents estimation results. Section 6 summarizes 
our ﬁ  ndings, provides conclusions, and makes policy recommendations.
FEDERAL TAX POLICY
Assuming that all qualiﬁ  cation requirements are met, the tax consequences to 
an employee who receives and exercises ISOs are summarized as follows.2 Section 
421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 speciﬁ  es that upon receipt of an ISO, 
the employee reports no income on his/her income tax return. If an ISO is exercised, 
i.e., converted into stock, no tax obligation is created. It is only once the underlying 
shares are sold that the tax is levied. Federal tax policy treats income from the sale 
of these shares (assuming that they have been held for more than one year) as capital 
gains that are taxed at the (lower) capital gains tax rate. 
For example, assume that the Fair Market Value (FMV) of XYZ Corporation stock 
is $1 on 1/1/99, and an employee is granted stock options priced at $1. On 3/31/00 
when the FMV is $41, the employee exercises his option and later sells the stock on 
5/1/01 for $101 per share. The $40 appreciation in value between the option price and 
the FMV at the date the option is exercised does not get recognized immediately, but 
is deferred until the time of sale of the stock. The further increase in value of $60 is 
not recognized for income tax purposes until the stock is sold. Once the stock is sold, 
the generated income is then taxed at the lower capital gains tax rate. 
Prior to 1990, this preferential tax treatment of capital gains did not exist because 
the maximum income tax rate on ordinary income was the same as the capital gains 
tax rate of 28%. Accordingly, no tax beneﬁ  t could result from receiving compensation 
as capital vs. ordinary income, which may account for the relatively low occurrence 
of stock options. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 created a minor differential 
between the two tax rates of three percentage points. The preferential tax treatment 
applied to long-term capital gains became more substantial after President Clinton’s 
1993 Revenue Reconciliation Act, which increased the maximum marginal income tax 
rate to 39.6%. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 created additional encouragement for 
stock option compensation by reducing the maximum capital gains tax rate to 20%. 
Since most CEOs face a marginal income tax rate of 39.6% and a capital gains tax rate 
of 20%, there can be a very substantial difference in the two tax rates of up to 19.6 
percentage points. In summary, tax law changes during the 1990s have created a sub-
stantially different tax treatment between income from wages and income from stock 
options, creating both a tax deferral and a tax reduction opportunity for CEOs. 
To address the impacts of these changes in tax policy on the ﬁ  rm, we follow Scho-
les et al. [2002] and hold the employee indifferent between the two types of options, 
while allowing the ﬁ  rm to determine the best compensation strategy. CEOs prefer 
incentive (ISOs) to non-qualiﬁ  ed (NQO) stock options, due to the lower capital gains 
tax rate, a ﬁ  rm will only prefer ISOs if the tax saving to the CEO is greater than the 
taxes due by the ﬁ  rm, since ISOs are not a tax deduction for the ﬁ  rm. Scholes et al. 
[2002] show this as
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Thus, ISOs are preferred as long as the corporate marginal tax rate tcorp. is less 
than the difference in the CEOs tax rates on ordinary income (tw) and capital gains 
(tc) divided by one minus the capital gains tax rate [see Scholes et al., 2002, 193]. 
MODEL
Similar to previous studies addressing the growth of nonwage beneﬁ  ts as a form of 
tax avoidance and its impacts on tax revenues, we examine if tax policy as described 
in Section 2 is associated with the recent increase in CEO stock options as a form of 
nonwage compensation. Building on Woodbury’s [1983] model, we assume there are 
only two forms of employee compensation: 1) the quantity of wages and 2) the quantity 
of nonwage stock options. We also assume that CEOs have a say about their form of 
compensation and that they are trying to maximize their expected value of wealth.
It is important to remember that the compensation a CEO receives is the after 
tax wages and stock options. Salary or wages are taxed at the ordinary income tax 
rate, while stock options are taxed at the capital gains tax rate (assuming that stock 
options are held for over a year.) This creates an incentive for CEOs to be paid in 
stock options in lieu of salary considering the time value of money and that the capital 
gains tax rate is lower than the income tax rate.
 
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE AND DATA 
To empirically investigate if tax incentives have an impact on CEO stock option 
compensation, we regress a measure of CEO stock option compensation on the mar-
ginal income and capital gains tax rates while controlling for other factors. Speciﬁ  -
cally, we estimate
(2)  SO t t x iw w c c k k i i
k
=+ + + + ∑ αβ β β ε () () ,     
 
where SOi is a measure of stock option compensation of CEO i in a given year, tw is the 
marginal income tax rate, tc is the long-term capital gains tax rate, xk,i is a vector of control 
variables, α and the β’s are parameters to be estimated, and εi is an error term.
In our analysis, we estimate equation (2) three times. The ﬁ  rst estimation is a 
logit model where the measure of a CEO’s stock option compensation is a dichotomous 
variable which takes on the value “1” if a CEO received any stock options at all, zero 
otherwise. Once we determine if preferential tax treatment increases the probabil-
ity of stock option compensation, we then want to determine if the inﬂ  uence of tax 
policy is statistically and economically signiﬁ  cant in increasing CEO stock option 
compensation. We re-estimate equation (2) using a Tobit model where the dependent 
variable now is the share of stock option compensation relative to total compensa-
tion received by a CEO. Finally, in a third estimation, we again use a Tobit model in 
which the (Black-Scholes) value of stock options granted to a CEO in a given year is 
the dependent variable.3
Before ISOs can be exercised, they must be vested. That is, there is a waiting 
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tied to the options can be bought. It is common that a constant fraction of the total 
amount vests each year. While information on the vesting period is not included in 
ExecuComp, we assume that the vesting period is 5 years, a commonly used value, 
and that the ﬁ  rst 20 percent of the total Black-Scholes value vests in the year follow-
ing the year in which the stock options were granted. The remaining 80 percent of the 
total value are assumed to vest in equal 20-percent increments over the following 4 
years. In order to construct the dependent variable, we sum 20 percent of the reported 
Black-Scholes values of each of the preceding 5 years.4
It should also be noted that the information in ExecuComp does not permit to 
distinguish ISOs from NQOs (which do not have the same tax advantages for the 
employee as ISOs). Also, a maximum of $100,000 worth of stock options that vest 
in a given year can receive the beneﬁ  cial tax treatment of ISOs (see Scholes et al. 
for more detail.) Therefore, we use the following procedure: If the sum of 20 percent 
of the reported Black-Scholes values of the previous 5 years is less than $100,000, 
we use that value as the dependent variable. If that sum exceeds $100,000, we use 
$100,000 as the value of the dependent variable for that observation. As justiﬁ  cation 
for this procedure, we refer to a business practice that is not uncommon: Companies 
keep records of the amount that an individual has already received in ISOs. If a ﬁ  rm 
intends to grant more ISOs to that same individual, but that additional grant would 
move the total above the $100,000 vesting maximum, the amount which is in excess 
of the maximum is issued in NQOs instead. As an additional measure to ensure that 
the included stock options indeed are ISOs (as opposed to NQOs), we use the follow-
ing procedure: We exclude ﬁ  rms whose corporate tax rate is higher than 24.5 percent 
(before 1997) or 29.6 percent (from 1998-2000), respectively. The justiﬁ  cation for that 
is that ﬁ  rms will only be willing to issue ISOs if doing so does not put them at a tax 
disadvantage. As can be seen in equation (1), ﬁ  rms prefer to pay CEOs in ISOs as 
long as the corporate marginal tax rate tcorp. is less than the difference in the CEOs 
ordinary income tax rate minus the capital gains tax rate divided by one minus the 
capital gains tax rate. Assuming that CEOs hold their stock options for ﬁ  ve years, 
for the period between 1993-1997 ﬁ  rms will prefer to pay CEOs with ISOs as long as 
their corporate tax rate is less than 24.5 percent. Since the capital gains tax rate fell 
in 1998, ﬁ  rms for the period of 1998-2000 prefer ISOs as long as their corporate tax 
rate is less than 29.6 percent. These two tax rates have been established in Scholes 
et al. [2002] as cutoff points below which issuing ISOs has tax beneﬁ  ts for both the 
employee and the ﬁ  rm.
In addition to the two tax rates in equation (2), we include several control variables 
at the level of the economy, the ﬁ  rm, and the individual that may be expected to impact 
the value of stock options granted to a CEO. To control for the overall increase in the 
stock market, we incorporate the annual average value of the NASDAQ index.
As suggested by Hall and Liebman [2000], the recent increase in stock option 
compensation may be due to the increase in the stock market and the increase in 
the current market value (MV) of the ﬁ  rm. Following their suggestion, we also in-
corporate the current market value as a control variable. However, Mehran [1995] 
suggests that by compensating CEOs with stock options, they are tied more closely 
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problem. The MV of a ﬁ  rm may therefore be endogenous since it may inﬂ  uence the 
amount of stock options a CEO would like to receive and stock option compensation 
potentially altering a ﬁ  rm’s MV. Unlike Hall and Liebman [2000], we control for this 
potential endogeneity of a ﬁ  rm’s market value. We obtain an instrument for a ﬁ  rm’s 
current market value by regressing it on its lagged value, the annual average of the 
NASDAQ index, a ﬁ  rm’s sales, return on assets, and net income, and the estimated 
Black-Scholes value of ISOs which a CEO receives. The ﬁ  tted value from this regres-
sion is used in our main estimation.
Following Rose and Wolfram [2002] and Mehran [1995], we further control for 
ﬁ  rm performance by incorporating the ﬁ  rm’s annual sales, return on assets, and net 
income (after extraordinary items and discontinued operations). Sanders [2001] sug-
gests that while one might think that these variables are positively associated with the 
value of stock options granted (as a “reward” for good results), the opposite might be 
the case due to a tendency to grant stock options in companies which perform poorly. 
This might happen if stock options are used in an attempt to attract CEOs who can 
help turn around the company. 
As additional controls at the ﬁ  rm level, we include one dummy variable each for 
small companies (smallest 10 percent in terms of number of employees) and large 
companies (largest 10 percent). The rationale for these two dummies is that small 
ﬁ  rms may be facing cash ﬂ  ow problems, creating the incentive to compensate CEOs 
with stock options instead of salary to help maintain a higher cash ﬂ  ow position. On 
the other hand, larger ﬁ  rms may have a more established history of offering stock 
options and economies of scale or scope when issuing stock options. 
We also included a variable that takes on the value “1” if the CEO is on the 
company’s board of directors, zero otherwise. The rationale for including this variable 
is that a CEO who is a board member presumably has more inﬂ  uence on the deter-
mination of his/her compensation package than a CEO who is not on the board. At 
the individual level, we include the value of a CEO’s total compensation since there 
is some evidence that CEOs with high salaries are also the ones who receive large 
amounts of stock options.
We collect annual compensation data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data-
base from 1992 to 2000.5 Thus, we can examine the changes in tax law that took place 
after 1992 that favor stock option compensation over salary from a tax perspective. 
One advantage of the ExecuComp database is its large size. It follows a total of 2,412 
companies over time, which are (or were) a member of the S&P 1,500 (consisting of 
the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600). Initially, our data 
set includes 93,867 individual-year observations. This number is reduced to 62,279 
observations due to the exclusion of ﬁ  rms whose ﬁ  scal year does not end in December 
in order to properly account for any tax change effects. We also exclude observations 
for executives whose reported value of stock options granted in a certain year is miss-
ing which reduces the number of observations to 53,471.6 To ensure that ﬁ  rms would 
pay CEOs ISOs (as opposed to NQOs), we exclude ﬁ  rms whose corporate tax rate is 
higher than 24.5 percent (before 1997) or 29.6 percent (from 1998-2000), respectively. 
This restriction together with limiting the sample to CEOs leaves us with slightly 
more than 4,000 executive-year observations. Summary statistics for all the variables 
used in our estimations are presented in Table 3.350 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  3
  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Estimations
  Mean Standard  Deviation
Dependent Variables
Stock option indicator (0 if no stock options, 1 if any stock options)  0.92  0.27
Value of stock options (as share of total CEO compensation)  40.78  30.56
Value of stock options ($ thousand)  88.38  29.67
Independent Variables
Max. marginal income tax rate  39.51  0.85
Long-term capital gains tax rate  21.55  3.17
Annual NASDAQ average  2,315.07  1,008.68
Firm’s sales ($ million)  4,109.68  11,475.11
Firm’s return on assets  0.63  17.54
Firm’s net income ($ million)  241.56  1,071.86
Firm’s market value ($ million)  6,992.7  22,181.20
Small ﬁ  rm  0.10  0.30
Large ﬁ  rm  0.10  0.30
CEO’s total compensation ($ thousand)  3,787.92  9,804.69
In our analysis, we assume that the marginal incomes of the CEOs in our sample 
are taxed at the maximum marginal income tax rate. For simplicity, we follow Auer-
bach and Siegel [2000], Goolsbee [2000], and Rose and Wolfram [2000] and assume 
that CEOs do not face the alternative minimum tax rates.7 We also assume that at 
the time of the stock option grant, CEOs know which capital gains tax rate they will 
face in the following year. This seems a realistic assumption to make since tax law 
changes are typically announced before they go into effect.8 
RESULTS
First, we want to examine if the preferential tax treatment of capital gains vs. 
ordinary income alters the decision of CEOs whether to receive stock options at all. 
Results from the estimation of a logit model are presented in Table 4. An inspection 
of the estimates of the two tax rates shows that the effects of both are in the expected 
direction and are highly statistically signiﬁ  cant, which is consistent with Hall and 
Liebman [2000]. Furthermore, the effects are rather substantial. An increase in the 
marginal income tax rate of one percentage point makes the average ﬁ  rm almost 18 
percent more likely to compensate their CEO with stock options. Similarly, an increase 
in the capital gains tax rate by one percentage point reduces the probability that a CEO 
is compensated in stock options by approximately 7 percent. Collectively, these results 
help explain some of the tremendous increases in CEO stock option compensation. By 
2000, over 95 percent of CEOs received some type of stock option compensation.
It is noteworthy that the impact of the marginal income tax rate is more than twice 
the respective value for the capital gains tax rate (in absolute value), which contra-
dicts the ﬁ  nding in Hall and Liebman [2000] of a much stronger effect of the capital 
gains tax rate. One reason for this difference may be that our ExecuComp 1992-2000 
data set captures the 1997 capital gains tax cut, which was not available in Hall and 
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whether there is an increase in the marginal income tax rate or a decrease in the 
capital gains tax rate of equal size. However, our results suggest that CEOs respond 
differently to such changes.
 TABLE  4 
  Logit Regression Results for Stock Option Value
  (Reported Estimates are Odds Ratios, Standard Errors in Parentheses)
  Stock Option Indicator
  (0 if no stock options,
  1 if any stock options)
Max. marginal income tax rate  1.17638
 (0.04753)**
Long-term capital gains tax rate  0.92776
 (0.02352)**
Annual NASDAQ average  1.00018
 (0.00010)
Firm’s sales ($ million)  0.99998
 (0.00001)*
Firm’s return on assets  0.97642
 (0.00637)**
Firm’s net income   0.99987
($ million)  (0.00009)
Firm’s market value ($ million)  0.99999
 (0.00001)
Small ﬁ  rm  2.32723
 (0.59892)**
Large ﬁ  rm  1.16246
 (0.22786)
CEO’s total compensation ($ thousand)  1.00077
 (0.00007)**




* statistically  signiﬁ  cant at 5%
** statistically  signiﬁ  cant at 1% 
Interestingly, a ﬁ  rm’s size may also alter the probability of CEOs being compen-
sated with stock options. Large and small ﬁ  rms are approximately 1.2 and 2.3 times 
as likely as medium-size ﬁ  rms (the omitted category) to compensate their CEOs with 
stock options. This is consistent with results found by Mehran [1995] and Jensen and 
Meckling [1976], suggesting that stock options may help reduce the principal-agent 
problem, which large ﬁ  rms are more likely to face. It is also consistent with results 
found by Sanders [2001], suggesting that stock options are used by smaller ﬁ  rms who 
are more likely to be cash constrained. 
Many of the other control variables are statistically signiﬁ  cant, but their impact 
on the probability that a CEO receives stock options is relatively small. For example, 
a $1-million increase in sales is associated with a 0.002-percent decrease in the prob-
ability that a CEO receives any stock options at all. While this estimate is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant (p-value = 0.039), we do not consider it to be “economically signiﬁ  cant.” 352 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In our estimation, we ﬁ  nd that, on average, the probability of receiving stock op-
tions is actually decreased for CEOs who are also on the board of directors, but the 
coefﬁ  cient is estimated with so little precision (p-value = 0.87) that it does not seem 
very meaningful.
After investigating whether the marginal income tax rate and the capital gains 
tax rate have an impact on the probability that a CEO receives any kind of stock 
option compensation, we now examine how large an impact there is. As mentioned 
previously, we approach this issue in two alternative ways. One approach uses the 
value of stock options received by a CEO as a share of total compensation while the 
other uses the (Black-Scholes) value measured in thousands of dollars. The explana-
tory variables are the same as in our initial logit estimation9, and both estimations 
use a Tobit model since the dependent variables are restricted to a range of [0,100]. In 
the case of the share variable, the lower and upper limits are “by construction” since 
the variable is obtained by dividing the value of stock options by the value of total 
compensation (consisting of salary, bonus, and value of stock options). In the case of 
the Black-Scholes value of stock options, the lower and upper limits of the dependent 
variable are $0 and $100,000, respectively, since a number of CEOs do not receive 
any stock options and since the tax beneﬁ  ts apply only to the “ﬁ  rst” $100,000 of ISOs 
per vesting period.10
The results of both Tobit estimations (with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity) are presented in Table 5. We ﬁ  nd that a one-percentage point 
increase in the marginal income tax rate increases the share of stock option compen-
sation by almost two percentage points. The 1993 marginal income tax rate increase 
from 31 percent to 39.6 percent leads to an increase in the share of CEO stock option 
compensation of over 16 percentage points. While Hall and Liebman [2000] suggest that 
the income tax rate has only a small effect on the share of stock option compensation 
once the market value of a ﬁ  rm is incorporated, our results suggest that the marginal 
income tax rate is a major contributor to the increase in the stock option share. 
Expressed in dollar terms, we ﬁ  nd that an increase in the marginal income tax 
rate of one percentage point is associated with an average increase in the Black-
Scholes value of $15,813. Both of these estimates are highly statistically signiﬁ  cant 
and suggest that the effect of the 1993 income tax increase of 8.6 percentage points 
creates a very substantial increase in stock options for the average CEO, generating 
an increase in stock option pay approximately equal to $136,000 per CEO. While 
Goolsbee [2000] suggests that the increase in the 1993 income tax rate caused only 
a transitory short-term reduction in the total taxable income and Rose and Wolfram 
[2002] ﬁ  nd that tax policy has little to no effect on non-wage compensation, our results 
(covering the later time period from 1992 to 2000) show that an increase in marginal 
income taxes does cause an increase in stock option compensation. 
Overall, our results show that the marginal income tax rate increase in the 1990s 
greatly contributed to the increase in the share of CEO stock option compensation as 
well as the increase in the dollar value of stock option compensation, which differs 
from Hall and Liebman [2000], Goolsbee [2000], and Rose and Wolfram [2002]. 
The impact of the capital gains tax is also highly statistically signiﬁ  cant and of 
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rate leads to an average decrease of almost one percentage point in the stock option 
share. This result suggests that the 1997 capital gains tax rate reduction from 28 
percent to 20 percent led to a 7.7 percentage point increase in the share of stock op-
tion compensation. 
 TABLE  5
  Tobit Regression Results for Share and Value of Stock Options
  (Robust Standard Errors to Account for Heteroskedasticity in Parentheses)
  Share of stock options  Value of stock options
  (percent of total compensation)  ($ thousand)
Max. marginal income tax rate  1.928  15.813
 (0.772)*  (5.384)**
Long-term capital gains tax rate  -0.963  -4.506
 (0.267)**  (2.139)*
Annual NASDAQ average  0.002  0.024
 (0.001)*  (0.007)**
Firm’s sales ($ million)  0.00001  -0.0007
 (0.00005)  (0.0011)
Firm’s return on assets  -0.038  -1.035
 (0.038)  (0.385)**
Firm’s net income ($ million)  -0.00026  -0.009
 (0.00074)  (0.008)
Firm’s market value ($ million)  0.00018  0.0002
 (0.00004)**  (0.0008)
Small ﬁ  rm  7.617  60.439
 (2.309)**  (18.008)**
Large ﬁ  rm  2.067  25.001
 (1.736)  (17.221)
CEO’s total compensation ($ thousand)    0.054
   (0.011)**
CEO on Board of Directors  6.694  5.048
 (7.123)  (46.749)
Constant -32.346  -389.256
 (32.260)  (225.3901)
Observations 4,223  4,223
“R-Squared” 0.01  0.07
* statistically signiﬁ  cant at 5%
** statistically signiﬁ  cant at 1%   
Expressed in dollar values, the average decrease in stock option compensation 
associated with a one-percentage point increase in the long-term capital gains tax 
rate is $4,506. The capital gains tax rate reduction of 8 percentage points creates 
roughly a $36,000 increase in stock option compensation per CEO. While Auerbach 
and Siegel [2000] ﬁ  nd only a small adjustment in the net long-term capital gains to a 
change in the capital gains tax rate for wealthy individuals, our results suggest that 
CEOs are using tax avoidance strategies to increase their earnings as a response to 
the reduction in the capital gains tax rate. While our results differ from those found 
in Hall and Liebman [2000] and Auerbach and Siegel [2000], it should be mentioned 
that the forms of capital gains measured are quite different, as the data set that was 
used in their studies was from corporate proxies and 10k ﬁ  lings. Additionally, our 
time period captures the 1997 capital gains tax cut, which may better reﬂ  ect a current 
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As for the control variables, the NASDAQ index has the expected positive im-
pact on the value of CEOs’ stock options, but the tremendous increase in stock op-
tion pay during the 1990s is not solely explained by the strong performance of the 
stock market. Supporting Hall and Liebman [1998 and 2000] we ﬁ  nd that increases 
in the ﬁ  rm’s value will increase a CEO’s stock option compensation. They ﬁ  nd that 
the median elasticity of CEO compensation with respect to the ﬁ  rm’s market value 
more than tripled from 1.2 to 3.9 between 1980 and 1994. They further suggest that 
CEO stock option compensation increased due to the increase in the market value 
of a ﬁ  rm as opposed to tax policy. Contrary to their results, we ﬁ  nd that the market 
value of a ﬁ  rm has a positive, but very small impact once we control for the potential 
endogeneity problem. 
“Sales,” “return on assets,” and “net income,” on the other hand, are negatively 
related to stock option compensation (with the exception of the very imprecisely 
estimated effect of sales in the “share” equation). As suggested by Sanders [2001], 
this may have to do with the hiring of CEOs to turn a company around. Note that all 
six estimates are relatively small in magnitude, which is consistent with Rose and 
Wolfram [2002]. 
Our results also suggest that indeed there is a tendency in small as well as in large 
companies to issue more stock options to CEOs than in medium-sized ﬁ  rms. CEOs of 
small-sized ﬁ  rms earn an estimated 7.6 percentage points in stock option share and 
approximately $60,000 more in stock option value, with p-values of less than 0.01, 
while CEOs of large-sized ﬁ  rms earn an estimated 2.1 percentage points in stock op-
tion share and approximately $25,000 more in stock option value. Both large-size ﬁ  rm 
estimates, however, are not statistically signiﬁ  cant at traditional signiﬁ  cance levels. 
Our estimation shows that higher-paid CEOs also receive a larger amount of stock 
options. However, stock option compensation, on average, only increases by $54 for an 
additional $1,000 in total compensation. Finally, our two Tobit estimations suggest 
that being on the board of directors increases a CEO’s stock option compensation, 
both measured as share of total compensation and in dollar terms. Both estimates 
are fairly large in magnitude (average increase of 6.7 percentage points and $5,084, 
respectively) and seemingly contradict the result from our logit estimation where we 
found a negative impact of the “director” variable on the probability of stock option 
compensation. However, it is possible that the amount of stock option compensation 
conditional on receiving any stock options increases even while the probability of be-
ing compensated in stock option decreases. Moreover, all estimates of the “director” 
variable have rather large p-values, and our results may be explained by a low level 
of precision in the estimates.
In summary, all results suggest that the recent changes in tax policy have gener-
ated an increase in the share and value of stock options for CEO compensation, even 
after controlling for factors at the economy, ﬁ  rm, and individual level. The estimated 
effects of changes in the examined tax rates are highly statistically signiﬁ  cant and of 
substantial magnitude. A comparison of the effects of the two tax rates shows that, as 
expected, the estimated coefﬁ  cients of the two tax rates have the opposite sign. This 
is consistent with Woodbury [1983], who ﬁ  nds that higher taxed compensation will 
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of the marginal income and capital gains tax rates on the CEO share and value of 
stock option compensation is quite different, a result that cannot be expected based on 
economic theory. In the case of the “share” estimation, the magnitude of the marginal 
income tax rate is approximately twice as large as the impact of the capital gains tax 
rate. In the case of the “dollar value” estimation, the effect of the income tax rate is 
more than three times the size of the estimated effect of the capital gains tax rate. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There has been a tremendous increase in CEO stock option compensation during 
the 1990s. During the same time period, there was an increase in the marginal in-
come tax rates and a cut in the long-term capital gains tax rate. Results of this study 
suggest that current tax policy creates an increase in CEO stock option pay (both in 
terms of stock options as share of total compensation and in dollar terms), leading to 
reductions in CEOs’ tax payments. As the spread between income and capital gains 
tax rates increases, so will the incentive for a CEO to defer taxes and to avoid pay-
ing the higher tax rate by demanding a higher share of compensation in the form of 
stock options.
Our estimates show that the effect of the 1993 increase in marginal income tax 
rates from 31 percent to 39.6 percent generated a 16 percentage point increase in the 
share of stock options as well as an increase in stock option pay approximately equal 
to $136,000 per CEO. Similarly, the effect of the 1997 capital gains tax cut from 28 
percent to 20 percent is associated with an increase in stock option share of 7.7 percent-
age points and an increase in stock option pay of approximately $36,000 per CEO. 
A sense of the overall impact can be gained by the following approximation: If 
the sum of $172,000 for each of the CEOs in our data set gets taxed at the long-term 
capital gains tax rate, which is 11.6 or 19.6 percentage points lower than the respec-
tive marginal income tax rate for the relevant range of the data, the amount of tax 
revenues collected will be reduced by approximately $20,000 to $33,700 per individual. 
Considering that there are approximately 2,400 CEOs in our data set to whom this 
calculation applies, it reduces federal tax revenues by a total amount anywhere from 
$48 million to $81 million. 
There are several reasons why we believe that the true overall impact is likely to 
be substantially higher than our calculations suggest: First, we exclude ﬁ  rms whose 
ﬁ  scal year does not end in December, reducing the sample size by approximately 
one third. Second, while we only consider CEOs, in many corporations several other 
individuals receive stock options as part of their compensation package. Third, our 
data set is limited to the S&P 1,500 companies, but other ﬁ  rms use stock option 
compensation as well.
While this study does not support or discourage stock options as a form of CEO 
compensation, it does point out the importance of current tax policy and its incentives 
for CEOs to be paid in stock options to avoid tax payments. As policymakers debate 
future tax law changes, they should consider the effects of these changes on the mix 
of executive compensation and the resulting tax revenue consequences. In particular, 
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tax rate lead to a response on behalf of CEOs that is of at least twice the magnitude of 
responses that are associated with changes in the long-term capital gains tax rate. This 
result was found in all three of our estimations, and the estimates are highly statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant. Such a ﬁ  nding should be taken into consideration by policymakers 
when changes in the tax laws and their likely consequences are being discussed.
 NOTES
1.  Hall and Liebman (1998) show that between 1980 and 1994 the mean value of stock option grants 
rose by 683 percent from $155,000 to $1.2 million. During this time period they also found that the 
sum of all CEO compensation increased by 136 percent at the median and 209 percent at the mean.
2.  Section 422(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, deﬁ  nes an incentive stock option as “an option 
granted to an individual for any reason connected with his employment by a corporation, if granted by 
the employer corporation … to purchase stock of … such corporation” if several qualiﬁ  cation require-
ments are met. These appear in section 422(b) and include shareholder approval, grant period and 
exercise period requirements, option price restrictions, transferability restrictions, and ownership 
requirements.
3.  We establish $0 and $100,000 as the lower and upper limit, respectively, since the tax beneﬁ  ts apply 
only to the “ﬁ  rst” $100,000 of ISOs per vesting period.
4.  For the years 1987-1991 (for which no Black-Scholes value is reported in the data), we assume that 
the annual value is the same as the 1992 value.
5.  The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to require public ﬁ  rms in 1992 to disclose grants 
of stock options to their top ﬁ  ve executives as well as their option exercise activity in their proxy state-
ments.
6.  According to private communication with Standard & Poor’s, the value of stock options is missing 
when an executive did receive stock options in a year, but the company did not disclose sufﬁ  cient 
information to allow for the calculation of their Black-Scholes value.
7.  Since taxpayers must pay the greater of either their alternative minimum tax (AMT) or income tax 
liability, AMT was less of an issue during the 1990s than today, due to the 2001 and 2003 marginal 
income tax rate cuts.
8.  Furthermore, based on the political debates leading up to major changes in tax law, CEOs may have 
a fairly good sense for what the eventual tax changes may be even before they must comply.
9.  The estimation that has the share as dependent variable omits “CEO’s total compensation” as inde-
pendent variable since the total compensation is in the denominator of the share, i.e., including total 
compensation in the list of independent variables would violate the assumption of exogeneity.
10.  Both Tobit estimations are carried out with robust standard errors since a (Cook-Weisberg) test 
indicated the presence of heteroskedastic error terms. We also investigated the possibility of mul-
ticollinearity between the independent variables. Established guidelines indicate that there is no 
multicollinearity problem in any of our estimations. 
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